1: Garrett B-4, 5 (ca. 1888) 1891
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able to find their way back, settled in the mountains of Kitchiéna.'

The two above described classes of Kitchi are distinguished among themselves by terms signifying respectively, "Dwellers in tents," or "Nomads," and "Labourers," or "Subjects" (*Kopchi*). §15

The present Kitchi are said to outnumber the warriors in the proportion of four or five to one. The latter are estimated at some thirteen thousand families, of whom ten thousand are owned, the remainder being settled in the towns and villages. All these warrior Kitchi are divided into tribes, of which they distinguish three kinds: *sakiwi* (great tribes), *paskisi* (medium tribes), and *skiyiki* (small tribes). These are counted by tents or houses, each of which contains from five to twenty inmates. The great tribes are subdivided into *paskisi* and *skiyiki*, or merely into *skiyiki*, which term is also generally used to denote a tribe, whether great or small. The small tribes which are unconnected with an *sakiwi* are called isolated *skiyiki*. §17 [42]

The tribes, or clans, consist of the family of the chief, and a number of other families more or less closely connected with it. In their encampments the tent of the chief is conspicuous among the others by its size, for it is the council chamber, court of justice, and general meeting-place of the elders of the tribe, and in it general hospitality is exercised. Clan feeling and devotion to the chief are the leading characteristics of these wild people. The head of the tribe is, however, not an arbitrary ruler, the voices of the §16 §21 §23

[1] Hinton, *Au Kootchies, or Mountaineers*, &c., p. 110.

I: Current B-4, 5 (ca. 1880) 1891
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630
631 elders having great weight, and, as I shall subse-
633 quently point out, even the women are not excluded
from a share in the politics of the tribe.

175 Though more or less dominated by the numerous
184 conquerors who have successively, for three thousand
years, overrun those regions which are now called
Kivilistan, the Kivils have never ceased to own a
distinct nationality. Since the Ottoman conquest
they have been constantly wavering between the two
rival powers of Islam—the Sunnis and the Shias, as
represented by the Turks and the Persians respectively,
siding, according to the exigencies of the time, now
with one party and now with the other. Notwith-
721 standing their sufferings in the destructive wars of
649 conquest waged for centuries by Turk and Persian,
184 and the constant internal feuds fomented by both
those nations in order to weaken the power of the
Kivilish warriors, they still maintain a sort of semi-
independence, preserving their nationality as distinct
from that of their neighbours as in earlier days,
though possessing no dynasty, political constitution,
ancient religion, historical traditions, or literature, to
bind them together.

668 Three times during the present century have
national aspirations incited them to throw off the
Turkish yoke; but owing to the immense extent of
mountainous country over which they are scattered,
their successes have been but partial and ephemeral.
181 Representatives as they probably are of the ancient
179 Chaldeans, no other race has, perhaps, so long pre-
served its nationality under conditions so unfavourable.

97

related for centuries. Today it cannot be denied that some tribesmen, particularly the Barzāni, belong to their group because of kinship relation (the Kurdish term being birā, from arabic, ba'īla, "tribe," is used to describe a tribal subdivision still to be found which seems to represent a patrilineal clan), while at the same time it is perfectly clear that a great deal of membership is simply territorial.

It is important to notice that there are two main bodies of criminal law in Iraq, a civil code administered by judges appointed by the Ministry of Justice, and that commonly called "tribal law," executed by local administrative officers. The institution of dual legal systems was evoked by the existence of Arab and Kurdish tribes some of whose time-honored customs were, to say the least, out of joint with the provisions of a modern, quasi-European code. The differences between the two need not be considered in detail. In general, "tribal" law is more lenient in some respects, as in "justifiable" homicide (disposing of an erring female relative), and more stringent in others, such as adultery or rape. There are in the Rowanduz district a number of groups who can have recourse to tribal law, and its administration is not charged to the local judge, but is an added task of the qaimmaqam. Hence the office of that official in Rowanduz has often the aspect of a courtroom, the qaimmaqam and his clerk patiently and laboriously inquiring into the intricacies of some rural feud through an interminable parade of witnesses--coarsely-dressed

[77] manipulating these various systems and principles. Thus competing factions, manipulating the familiar (but in part mutually exclusive) systems, will establish different power hierarchies in different villages, resulting in the present variety of forms of social organization found in the area.

(2) However, one type of basic organization may be said to be commonly Kurdish. This is usually called *tribal*, and is based on the *lineage* principle. Any movement away from this basic framework of organization will be the result of the above type of manipulations, and may be seen as a step in a *de-tribalization* process. A special attempt will be made to explore the structure of the tribal group, and to mention to the pressures that tend to lead to its break-down.

Certain characteristics of the lineage system in its Kurdish application might profitably be stated immediately, to avoid misunderstandings. The Kurds practice close family endogamy with preferential FaDaDa marriage, and a Kurdish descent group shows many consequent characteristics, among which is a tendency towards constant branching and the establishment of new, independent endogamous subsections. The concept of a lineage, as developed for other areas, normally applies to an exogamous grouping. However, the main importance of the lineage concept is in the field of political organization, and it will be seen that the political functions of the Kurdish descent groups and the African lineage groups are essentially similar. This might be expected, if only from the following considerations: Women in Kurdish society are normally of minimal political importance, and matrilineal descent has no political significance. The *exactly* patrilineal descent group will be unmodified by any patterns of preferential marriage. Since this, in Kurdish society, is the politically significant group, the fact of endogamy has no direct political importance. I have therefore chosen to call this patrilineal descent group a *lineage* when politically recognized.

(2) After an orientation on some factors which are uniform over the whole South Kurdish area, notably in the field of subsistence and kinship, the formal lineage organization will be discussed, as well as the basic pattern of non-tribal formal organization, and the fundamental composition of the resulting local groups will be treated.

649 then probably be called an *aduvet*. This *aduvet* is ruled by a sacrificial leader, the *Beg* or *Pasha*. He is the head of the *aduvet* family, the *Begundo*. The size of the *aduvet* unit was considerable, even before sections of it became sedentary. In 1820, while still entirely nomadic, the *Jal* could muster 1000 infantry and 300 horses, and were said to number several thousand families (Koch *op. cit.*, p. 288, conflicting with his statement on p. 112).

• 649 7180. The *Jal aduvet* is divided into a number of tribes, five. The various lists of these component five conflict slightly in names and total numbers, but a characteristic enumeration of *Jal* five is:

(1) Ghezi group
- Wanda (Arabic) Ghezi
- Ghezzan
- Ghezi Bedouin
- Jamil clan
- Bamo clan
- Kamali

(2) Ghezzi
(3) Bakui
(4) Bakiddo
(5) Gelali
(6) Tachibani
(7) Bagbirmi
(8) Bhagirmi
(9) Arabic
(10) Ghezi-Zaranda
(11) Shaddi Tamil
- Shaddi Tamil
- Bamalam

The *five* is the primary political group and landowning unit. Membership in a *five* is patrilineally inherited, and the *five* itself approximates a maximal lineage. But though all members of the *five* should be able to trace patrilineal descent from one common ancestor, it may frequently become difficult to document the connection between some of the major kinship segments in any one *five*. And, on the other hand, every maximal lineage is not automatically regarded a *five*; the concept is fundamentally based on political [illegible] and [illegible] a functioning organization.

34

7: Gar(S) S-S (1971) 181.5 W8.11 Gar-S W8.11

consist and constitute a functioning organization. A single descent group or lineage is in Kurdish called *hez*; *Hez-i-Kuhe-Hawrew* is simply the family, all the descendants in male line from Kuhe Hawrew, and not a *tire* in any sense of the word. However, since the concept of the genealogically defined lineage group is important in the definition of the *tire*, and, in fact, ideally the whole basis of it, a certain confusing interchange of the terms might be expected. In the above list, *Hez-i-Jarwein*, the family or descendants of Jarwein, serves as the name of a *tire*; but this group is a *tire* by virtue of its organization as a political unit, not merely because relationship in a large *hez*, founded by Jarwein, has been recognized.

Further confusion may result from the use of Arabic synonyms for the Kurdish terms. Leach (op. cit., p. 13 ff) unsuccessfully attempts to make a distinction, based on size of the unit, between *tire* and *taifa*, the latter being in fact an Arabic term for *hez*, family.

The term *tire* is regularly used for tribe and tribal sections of highly variable size, and seems to refer to the political unit of the size which is significant in the context of immediate discussion. Thus the soldiery *Jaf* will tell strangers that he is of the *Jaf tire*, while among a group of *Jaf* the term *tire* will have reference to subtribe or branch.

Each *tire* in the above list is led by a hereditary *Rais* (leader), and has traditional rights to specific pastures and camping sites. These grazing rights are usually exclusive, or they may be shared with local villagers, who raise a crop in the spring and let the *Jaf* flocks graze there in the fall. Formerly, this relation between nomad and sedentary might be established by force by the *Jaf* on any land; now some rent is generally paid to the local farmers in return for right to pasturage. The migrations of the whole *Jaf* subtribe are coordinated, and the movements of each *tire* is regulated by its *Rais*, who serves as intermediary between his group and the *Begzade* leaders of the whole subtribe.

BRANCHES. With the natural growth of population in one *tire*, or due to tensions and conflicts within it, a branch may split off and become an independent unit. This group then traces descent from the parent group, but is formally independent. In the above

• 4/9 Ser, the Bandjar are such a branch, which has split off from the parent, Sheikh 'Imad Ibn. The Shaari group of Ibn, on the other hand, are all sons of one father, and so one of the Ibn takes precedence. Such groups have more than mere legendary unity. Firstly, as shareholders, they have the right of inheritance to each others' patrons and companies, in the case of one of the Ibn dying
4/5 out. There is also a minimum of political coordination: In the case of war or other far-reaching decisions, the leaders of all Shaari Ibn meet in a council. So that no one of them should have an advantage, the council meets in the town of a rich follower, not in the town of any one Ibn. The council reaches agreement by discussion, and has, as a body, no formal powers.

4/11 *KHEL.* Through the Ibn holds grazing rights in common, it will rarely camp in one unit, but generally divides into several separate encampments, each called a *khel*. The *khel* may vary in size and composition, but may roughly be regarded as a lineage segment. It is, however, held together by economic as well as lineage ties. Hired shepherds etc. may thus belong to a specific *khel* without being members of the *Jal subset*, or economic partnership between persons of different lineage segments may temporarily influence *khel* membership. The *khel* is led by an older man, more or less informally elected or granted authority because he is the person with the greatest power and prestige. The *khel* is thus primarily a residence unit, and is less permanent in its composition than the larger units which are based on descent only.

HOUSEHOLDS. Each *khel* in turn is made up of a number of households, frequently some 20—30, each inhabiting a separate tent.
5/2 The households seem to have roughly the same size and composition as those of the sedentary village Kurds, described above. If a father can afford the necessary expenses in tent and utensils, he will set up an independent household for his married son. Poor people, on the other hand, may find this impossible. — Marriage is preferably with FaBaDa or other close relatives, very rarely outside the Ibn. Bridegrice varies from £ 200 to occasionally nothing in the case of close relatives. Payment may take any form, either in kind or cash, but is computed in terms of money.

Self-

[illegible] cooperating men should not engage in economic pursuits, their main [illegible] role was formerly that of warriors, protecting the people and flocks [illegible] from attacks by other groups. Only the very poor herded their own cattle. Where one person does not own enough animals to make up the normal herding unit of 100, composite herds are created along kinship lines, with father, brother, sons, etc. Differences in wealth are tremendous, apparently on a continuous scale, some persons owning a total of 2,000 animals, some as few as 10, some quite destitute and dependent on richer relatives for subsistence and work.

[illegible] With the tendency towards parallel cousin marriage, every group [illegible] tends to split up into separate lineages, which continue separate over long periods of time. Thus semi-endogamous sections are created within the tire itself, usually identified with separate *kheli*. But since the *kheli* is a residential unit, the main unity of which stems from economic ties, persons of any lineage section may travel for longer or shorter periods with any *kheli* to which their economic activities might attach them. Generally, one of these semi-endogamous lineage sections will form the wealthy core of a *kheli*, to which a more or less variable group of less privileged families, related or not, are connected by economic ties.

[illegible] These endogamous tendencies are also operative in the family of [illegible] the *Ketz*. The position as *Ketz* is inherited, and the family of the [illegible] *Ketz* therefore takes on the appearance of a noble clan or caste. The process by which such a caste would truly emerge, however, would be through intermarriage with the wealthy lineage segments of other tires. There seem in fact to be few such kinship ties established between *Ketz* families of different groups. A certain number of marriages will be exogamous so far as the *Ketz* family is concerned, if only from the occasional lack of available spouses in the limited family group. But these exogamous marriages more frequently establish ties between the *Ketz* and wealthy lineage segments within the commoners within the tire itself. It would thus seem that marriages are manipulated to reinforce the power of the *Ketz* within the tire itself, rather than to separate him off as a member of a distinctive and noble caste. To unify a distinction between noblemen and commoners within the tire would thus be an error, since the separa-

some of the Ruti lineage follows from common marriage usage, and is no different in nature from the appointment of the wealthier as compared to the poorer lineage sections of the group.

The hereditary position as Ruti is simply vested in the leading lineage segment of the two. An interesting problem arises as to what adjustments are made in the event of decline in wealth or the appearance of other impediments to leadership in this lineage. It is customary for persons in a position of leadership to appoint their successor, usually a son, while they are still in a position of control. In the case of disagreement between the existing Ruti and the general population as to who should succeed him, the pattern of succession is probably decided by the line in the balance between the positive power (primarily economic) of the Ruti, and the degree of general resistance to his decision. Where the power and prestige of the Ruti has declined, leadership might thus fairly easily be shifted to a stronger and wealthier collateral line. (Compare p. 126 for a more overtly democratic mechanism of appointing successor to the Ruti.)

I had no opportunity to ascertain the actual extent of the power vested in the Ruti. It would seem to be rather dependent on his means and personality, but, these permitting, to afford him considerable possibilities to enforce his decisions. He is on the other hand regarded as being subject to the Beja in all matters, and directly responsible to them.

The Beja leaders of the Jal are sometimes represented as belonging to a line of their own; the Beyanda; more correctly the Beyanda is regarded as a family or clan, divided into the three branches Wellad Begi, Kikharwa Begi, and Bahrwa Begi. The political head may be drawn from any of them. The Kikharwa Begi and Bahrwa Begi of today are descended by 7 generations from the common ancestor Zahir Beg. The Wellad Beg are somewhat further removed. All the Beyanda are now settled and live as absentee landowners of numerous Jal and other villages. It is thus extremely difficult to form any picture of the true position of the leaders in the political organization of the nomadic Jal. Some 60 years ago, authority was divided between the two Beyanda brothers Osman and Mahmud Pasha, the latter being the leader of the nomadic section. Mahmud Pasha was

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POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF THE HAMAWAND.

According to their own traditions, the Hamawands migrated South-ern Kurdistan from Persia as nomadic herdsmen. Seeing the opportunities offered by the ineffectual nature of Ottoman governmental control, they entered on a career of brigandage, hunting the caravans that passed between Persia and Iraq. The enmity existing between the Persian and Ottoman empires made this all the more feasible, since any activity detrimental to one power had the covert support of the other. Though the Hamawands have settled in villages, they did not immediately take up agriculture, except for small garden patches of melons etc. As they proudly assert: after more than a generation we regard our daily bread with our gunbarrels. All accounts by early travellers describe how the small group terrorized the district by striking quickly and effectively in widely separated areas. Only after the First World War did their economy become really based on farming. Through this turbulent history, tribal political organization retained its importance, and some features of the system may be seen very clearly.

The Hamawand group as a whole is regarded as one tire of the same magnitude as the various components Jaf does. Even in its greatest period of glory, the Hamawand tire could muster no more than 250-300 horsemen, implying a total population of 1,000-1,500 individuals. The process of branching has however been intensive; in fact, as compared to the Jaf, the Hamawand political structure seems to be based on a clearer political recognition of the segmentation into lineage sections which follows from the marriage pattern. The hierarchy of progressively more inclusive lineage segments, from the single village level (population 10—100) and up to the maximal lineage group, is given political significance.

There is no single leader of the whole Hamawand tire[1]); questions concerning the group as a whole are discussed and decided in a council made up of the Aghas (=headmen) of the 4 primary branches. Each of these branches are again divided into sub-branches,

[1]) Accordly, Mohammad Amin Agha of the Bapirdo clans possesses position

[illegible] and so on ending at the village level. The leader of any category of group is called *Agba*, any branch or named section thereof will in certain contexts be called a *tiva*.

The genealogy of these branches is traced, but varies somewhat from village to village. Such variations derive partly from the lack of interest in collateral units, partly from an attempt to stress certain relationships or to construct a more flattering genealogy.

Diagram 6 traced in male line from the common ancestor Hamma, the founder of the tiva, nine generations removed from the present

Diagram No. 6. A Tarok model of their position in the Hammond kinship organization.

adult group. The origins of Hamma, having no political significance to the group, are of little interest to the villagers, though Arabic origin is occasionally claimed for its prestige value.

One version was collected in the village of Kwei Sarki: Hamma had 4 sons, Sellar, Yadjar, Rashid, and Ramman; from these are descended the 4 major branches of the group. The villagers themselves claim to be Yadjar. They could indicate the areas where the descendants of the three other sons live, but were unable or unconcerned in tracing relations in any greater detail.

In the village of Targah, a somewhat different version was given. The major branches were named as Ramawand, Selarawand, Rashi-

wood, and Begunde. As will be noticed, the branch of Tadjar, to (a) which the Kani Sarde belong, is not in the list. The Kani Sarde (a) is in fact belong to the Begunde branch, as either Tadjar is the ancestor (a) of all the Begunde, or a smaller segment category has been elevated to the level of a major branch, for the greater glory of the Kani Sard group. The villagers in Tangah seem to belong to the Bahlowand division, again made up of the villagers from Tangah and Chahkandeh, the latter now having been abandoned and the villagers scattered. The Bahlowand were derived from the Kashowand, in unspecified fashion. A Tangah model of their position in the five would then read as shown in Diagram No. 4.

(b) The *Aghs* of a village is appointed or granted power by the male (c) inhabitants of that village. In practice, the position is hereditary, but not according to any rule of seniority, and village preference undoubtedly influences the process of succession. The village *Aghs* has only the authority which follows from his own power and prestige, and the goodwill of his followers.

The position as *Aghs* of one of the four major branches is either similarly hereditary, or, all there is no suitable son of the old *Aghs*, a new *Aghs* is elected by the villagers. These *Aghs* will generally have the position and means to support a group of retainers, paralleling the *Pyadenads* of the *Jal Begs*. They then have a vaguely institutionalized mechanism to enforce their authority. Thus, though the formal position of the *Aghs* of the four major Hanowand segments is unlike that of the *Jal Begunde*, the actual difference more reflect the difference in scale than in formal position.

Neither the *Jal* nor the Hanowand lineage organizations function (d) in the ideal pattern closely exemplified by the Cyrenaica Bedouin, discussed above. A position of authority and super-ordination does in fact become vested in the individual *Aghs* and *Kets*, who tends to apply coercive means to support such a hierarchy of authority. Though the ideal character of the political structure is that of a segmentary lineage organization, the system does in fact function in a somewhat different pattern, as will be shown more fully later.

tion and between sections of a single tribe, the procedure seems to be one of personal revenge, and not retaliation within the whole group to which the offender belongs. It therefore seems useful to emphasize this difference by limiting the term blood feud to its typical form, as found e. g. among the Nuba, and to explore the possible reasons why the jural concepts of collective responsibility, on which the blood feud pattern is based, are not applied to a Kurdish lineage group or segment of such.

It is necessary to emphasize the unique situation, as compared to most societies described in the anthropological literature, in which these jural principles are to be applied. Kurdish lineages are not organized factions within a community, as is often the case in other societies; nor do they have the usual ramifying kinship connections with other groups. With a high frequency of close kin marriage, as described above, a Kurdish lineage, and even the lineage segments down to the village level, are endogamous, socially isolated units. They are, furthermore, geographically isolated. The tribe as a whole occupies a large, contiguous territory; the members of the tribe are essentially the sole residents of that territory. The local group, the village, is also the lineage segment. There is no indigenous political authority above the level of the maximal lineage, and such a maximal lineage has no vital relations with other groups (except a certain minimum of trade). The maximal lineage can therefore, in the autonomous Kurdish system, be regarded as *the society*.

The concept of collective responsibility thus hardly applies in the usual sense to the relations between segments of *different* lineages —between groups in separate societies. Jural principles of this type can only be applied within moderately homogeneous societies, where any individual or a sociological person is an approximate equivalent of his co-lineage mates. (Fortes 1953). With the geographical separation of Kurdish lineages, furthermore, feud between them would in fact necessitate aggression into *strange* territory. The maximal lineage is a politically unified corporate group for purpose of defence, and thus conflicts on any scale between segments would lead directly to all-out war between the lineages to which they belonged. In such a situation, economic and other considerations favoring continued

• 5/9 4/8 powerful relations would take precedence over the desire for personal revenge on the part of anyone but the most powerful leader. Personal conflicts between such leaders might well be governed by the desire for revenge, and even the law involve whole groups in the conflict; but considerations of equality in retaliation would not be relevant on the cross-exogamic level, and blood feud is thus an inappropriate norm for cross-tribal feuds, as occurs when the interdictions cross that ostensibly governed the feud were.

In a system with endogamous lineages, conflicts between subsections of a sectional lineage, of the type discussed in Appendix II, would seem to lend themselves quite readily to solution by blood-feud. Whereas the individuals had few personal dealings with persons outside his own, there is much room for disputes and conflicting claims within the endogamous landholding one. Such disputes would not immediately become supra-communal problems, subject to all the attendant tactical and practical considerations, but would remain factions within the group, where concepts of justice and settlement by equality are more applicable. The only further prerequisite for a development of a blood feuding pattern is then a certain minimum strength of the kinship bonds, to ensure clear kinship alignment in the factions and non-universal identification with the kinship group and the union of kinsmen. This degree of development of the kinship bond seems to be lacking in Southern Kurdistan at the present time.

It should also be remembered that with the Kurdish type of lineage organization, the individual's loyalties are not to the descent group as abstracts, but are felt and expressed in terms of local groups, which very nearly correspond to the lineage segments. Because of this, any armed conflict between lineage segments will necessarily be in territorial terms; it will be a feud between villages. This complicating factor does, however, not exist in cases of conflict where there is no surplus of arable land (e. g. much Nineteenth century today), conquest and annihilation of villages, etc. The large territorial organization of the whole lineage is thereby underground by such internal inter-village wars, and characteristically enough it is the 'section or whatever in inter-lineage conflicts that

§3 how by overlapping his commodities area of free grace in his relations to them.

In thinking about social relations, the essentially bivalent relationship the word commodities for exigies — the latter being rigid and absolute, the former being defined in terms of concrete considerations of the specific situation. Obviously, different individuals with different temperaments, experiences, and values will have various ideas of what is commodities — consequently, any type of sociological definition that does not involve constant face-to-face relations with the subordinate must be an enemy one — hence the importance of the bodyguard, even for the more minor Kurdish leaders.

In the case of conflicting loyalties, the specific situation in the village and even communal decision which group identification takes precedence. This is clearly illustrated in choice between identification with, or loyalties to, the landlord, the lineage or his group, and the village community. How complicated considerations of power override general rules of loyalty is finally illustrated by conflicts within the family of the old Bokan Pasha.

§21 Lineage group vs. land. In the Kurdish tribal system, genealogical
§22 and land groups coincide, and these groups are also the organ-
§24 ized units in a formal political sense. A somewhat similar correspondence is characteristic of the non-tribal mixed villages. Thus, since they coincide, the relative importance of the identification with the kin group and with the political unit, as personified by the political officeholder or lord, can not easily be determined. Only in the rather unusual case where the two are different, do problems of identification and precedence arise.

§23 §25 An example of the relative powers of the landowner vs. the lineage leader is offered by the *Berai Gawra* group, settled on the land of Sheikh Mahmud as tenant farmers. The Berai Gawra are one of the branches of the *Mirawai* tire, the *Rais* of which is Said Ali Khalasi of Sulaimani.

Formally, the position of the *Rais* is quite similar to that in other tires, though more directly dependent on administrative approval. Succession is decided by a council of the important men of the tire villages. This council is limited by informal controls, being open to

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

on a village level. Eliminating the cases of type (a), there is still ample evidence of endogamous patterns of non-Islamic or pre-Islamic origin, especially in the Caucasus-Armenian area, of which the Kurdish mountains are geographically an extension. The customary law of Daghestan prescribes close kin marriage, and explicitly forbids the marriage with an outsider (ibid). The early ecclesiastical laws of Armenia attack next-of-kin marriages with great vehemence (ibid, p. 54), and such practices caused great concern among the early Christian missionaries, till they were eventually rooted out. Thus, rather than regard the Kurdish combination of patterns as a labile state produced by cross-cultural mixture, it would seem reasonable to grant the Kurdish «tribal» organization considerable antiquity as a stable variant or *type* of lineage organization, of some theoretical interest.

On a structural level, it can be argued that a pattern of FaBrDa marriage serves to reinforce the political implications of the lineage system. Solidarity to the patrilineal descent group in abstracto is minimal. Close family endogamy results in a direct correspondence between lineage segments and local groups, giving the descent groups a clear territorial framework in which the lineage organization can function. On the individual level, a man's political position and power depends in the last instance on the number of riflemen he can muster. However, only co-lineage males can be expected to give such political support. A pattern of FaBrDa marriage contributes to prevent alienation of immediate collateral lines, and re-affirms the old man's leading position in relation to his agnatic nephews, thereby vesting him with control over a larger agnatic group of males.

Where the lineage is found in other areas as a corporate group, it is usually connected with a kinship terminology of the «lineage» type, which, through unilineal emphasis and classificatory extensions contributes in defining and delimiting these corporate groups. Kurdish kinship terms, on the other hand, are purely «descriptive» in that they measure genealogical distance between near kin. Nor do they show any unilineal emphasis. In other words, they do not contribute in any way to the definition of unilineal corporate groups. However, when this terminology is seen in combination with the

7: Barth E-5 (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

FaBrDa marriage pattern, the characteristics become meaningful, and the different function of kinship terminology in the Kurdish type of lineage organization and other types of lineages emerges:

Where a moderately consistent pattern of FaBrDa marriage and other close family endogamy is followed, the local, endogamous community becomes in fact the descent group. In the Kurdish system, these local descent groups are given names — in effect *village* names, which thus indicate both residence and descent, and thereby political affiliation. The corporate framework of the lineage is thus given directly in the named residence units, and kinship terms are unnecessary to further emphasize this corporate character. On the contrary, the terminology measures collateral distance, of considerable importance where relatives beyond a certain degree tend to form separate, endogamous sub-sections, disruptive to village unity and ultimately conducive to fission. Essentially, however, the kinship terminology is liberated from its functions in defining political units in the lineage system, and is utilized simply to describe relationship, possibly with a primary interest in inheritance. Here the effect of the complex Islamic law of inheritance may have been considerable — if it has in fact been applied to sufficient extent in its more subtle ramifications.

A second modification of the usual pattern, concerned with law and the blood feud, would seem to follow from the combination of a lineage organization and preferential FaBrDa marriage. Fortes (1953) summarizes: «where the lineage is found as a corporate group, all the members of a lineage are to outsiders jurally equal and represent the lineage when they exercise legal and political rights and duties in relation to society at large. This is what underlies so-called collective responsibility in blood vengance and self-help as among the Nuer (Evans-Pritchard 1940) and the Bedouin (Peters 1951).» On the background of this, the probable absence of weak development of collective responsibilty and blood feud in Kurdish society might seem puzzling.

Where the lineage system is associated with a pattern of village endogamy, however, as in the Kurdish system, the maximal lineage becomes in effect «the society», not merely one organized group

within it. Thus the whole situation in which jural concepts are to be applied changes radically. No supra-lineage political authority is developed, and no interaction between a lineage and other groups is necessary, except for a certain minimum of trade. At the time of the present fieldwork, of course, and probably for most tribes in the area at most times in the last 100 years, the maximal lineages were in fact not totally independent. They were, however, subject to *external* administration, and that not consistently; and the indigenous social organization does not call for or lead to any supra-lineage integration. The concept of jural equivalence is thus meaningless as applied to a Kurdish maximal lineage; such a concept could only be relevant as applied *within* the lineage, between groups of recognized blood relatives within the political unit. In this case, the disruptive effects of conflicts between what are in fact territorial groups within the unit prevent the extension of patterns of revenge to include larger collectivities than the immediate family, or a group of accomplices.

However, the lineage organization is only one type of social organization prevalent in the Kurdish area. With the breakdown of this regional organization based on politically autonomous, endogamous descent groups, the integration of the separate, endogamous villages into larger political units poses a new problem. Non-tribal Kurdish social organization might be summarized as a system of hierarchical statuses, identified with particular individuals, and sanctioned by force more than anything else. This organization is then expanded into a larger, regional, semi-feudal system. This was at best a very labile structure, until frozen by the intervention of effective external administration which favored status quo. In the place of the regional displacement of lineage groups in large «tribal» districts, one finds an open web of relations between separate, endogamous, socially quite autonomous small villages. These form no natural larger units, except in purely physiographic or dialect terms. In this open web, feudal hierarchies might establish areas of influence, but until external administration imposed an arbitrary regional classification in terms of counties and districts, any areal units tended to be extremely fluid.

7: Barth E-S (1951) 1953 MA11 Kurd MA11

Parsons (1952) states the problem in general terms: «There seem to be certain elements of inherent instability in societies where the overwhelming bulk of the population is organized on the basis of peasant village communities. One of the reasons for this is the fact that the village community as a primary focus of solidarity can only within very narrow limits be an effective unit for the organization of the use of force. It is, in the face of any more extensive organization, not a defensible unit. Hence there must always be a 'superstructure' over a peasant society, which, among other things, organizes and stabilizes the use of force. The question is how far such a superstructure is, as it were, 'organically' integrated with the self-contained village communities and often the level of integration is not high.» (pp. 162-3).

This problem of *integration* the local non-tribal political institutions were unable to solve satisfactorily; and the secondary role played by the quite large Kurdish population in the history of the Middle East may to considerable extent be related to this failure.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MAll Kurd MAll
Rowanduz

CHAPTER 2

Political Structure Definition of Unit

The Kurdish term which in the foregoing pages I have crudely described as tribe is Ashiret. "The name of the Ashiret describes at once the people and the land they occupy. Thus it is possible to speak of 'Balik country' as a district on the map while the individual tribesman will describe himself as 'a Balik'. 619

An ashiret may consist of one or more patrilineal clans called taifa, the fundamental difference between the two being that whereas ashiret is essentially descriptive of a political group, taifa is descriptive of a kinship group. Thus in Balik there are three taifa usually known as Hallasherifi, Shevdini (or Shaimari) and Bakri; in "Soran" on the other hand there is just the one taifa of Sorani Bagawada. The final title of the Shevdini depends upon the context of reference. Shevdin is the name of the ancestor from whom all members of the Shevdini taifa nominally trace their descent, he was the 'founder' of the taifa; Shaimar on the other hand is the name of the district he came from. The Hallasherifi similarly all claim descent from a certain Halla Sherif said to have been a member of the Galali tribe of Silaimani district. In general the tendency seems to be to take the group name from the ancestor rather than the place. Ali Agha of Bayat in giving me his genealogy claimed that Shevdin had lived eight generations ago and that in those days his family had belonged to the Zerki tribe west of the Great Zab, and that they migrated to the east in search of better land.† It was interesting to note that Ali Agha was reluctant to admit that his taifa formed part of the Balik ashiret. With the loosening of the political ties that linked the three clans of the tribe he hoped soon to establish that the Shevdini were an ashiret in their own right. 614 * 619

* The same is not strictly true of the Sorani centred on Dergala. During the latter part of the 18th Century the name Soran was applied to a territory approximately corresponding to areas A and B of Map 1 over which the princes of Rowanduz had established a titular suzerainty. Hamid Amin Beg the Agha of Dergala claims direct descent from these former princes and he and his immediate kin call themselves the Sorani Bagawada - "the descendants of the Beys of Soran". The term Soran has no direct territorial significance today, but on Map 2 the area so named is that controlled by Hamid Amin Beg of Dergala.

† For comparison one may note that Sheikh Mohammed Agha of Balash, Agha paramount of the Balik and of the Hallasherifi taifa was also able to trace back his descent for eight generations but did not reach the name of Halla Sherif in the process.

8: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
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• 614 The taifa in turn is frequently divided into subsections called tira (branch), though in many contexts the two terms appear to be interchangeable. The Hallasherifi taifa referred to before are for instance subdivided into three tira each group claiming descent from one of the sons of Halla Sherif. These sons (I did not obtain their names) are supposed to have settled respectively in Berga, Celala and Rust, and these villages remain the centres of their respective tira to the present day. Thus the Agha of Rust is overlord of a number of villages by virtue of the fact that he is head of his tira. The Shevdini taifa is similarly subdivided into three tira, the names being given to me as Hedr Agha, Kaka Hasani and Hamdi Babakhr Agha - these being presumably the names of the ancestral founders of the lineage. On the other hand some persons at least did not seem to be clearly aware of this subdivision and on being asked the name of their tira would reply "Shevdin". Moreover I was assured by one informant that there is no difference between taifa and tira, but that the one is bigger than the other. This is I think an accurate description. Tira is a type of kinship group fairly frequently encountered by anthropologists. Usually termed lineage, but more aptly described by Firth as ramage, it differs only from the clan group in scale and political cohesion. With the loosening of political tie the distinction between the two types of grouping tends to disappear. The Agha of Rust for instance claimed to me that he was head of his own taifa and as such of equal rank to Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Balash. Sheikh Mohammad of course did not admit this claim but maintained that Mir Sadik, Agha of Rust was his subject.

From this description and the examples quoted it is clear that the terms ashiret, taifa and tira fall into the normal anthropological classifications of tribe, clan and lineage (ramage), with the single abnormality that the clans are in this case endogamous, or largely so.

Inheritance of Land Tenure

36/ The settlements for the most part consist of small villages (gund) scattered along the valleys. The term gund really includes both the houses and the cultivation surrounding them and may at times prove confusing. The gund of Banyurdan for instance contains two houses only, that of Dergala has over a hundred. Every gund is the 621 'property' of a landlord (Agha). If the Agha owns only one gund as in 923 the case of Hamid Agin Agha of Banyurdan he will live in it himself; if

*See C.Daryll Forde - Fission and Accretion in the Patrilineal Clans of a semi-Bantu community in Southern Nigeria J.R.A.I. Vol. 60; 314.
R.Firth - We, the Tikopia;370,371.
582. Note however that owing to the rule of ortho-cousin marriage, Kurdish taifa and tira tend to be endogamous rather than exogamous.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

be owns several as in the case of Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Walash or 414
Hamid Amin Beg of Dergala, he will live in one himself and appoint 423
headmen (kukha) as his agents in the other villages. In theory the
Agha is the absolute owner of all the land in the gund, the villagers 423
occupy and cultivate the land in the capacity of tenants and in return
pay him, in theory at any rate, the seemingly staggering rental of 50% 427
of the yield of the land. Again in theory the Agha has absolute
discretion to evict any tenant he disapproves of, and similarly the
tenant is free to leave whenever he chooses; the only property that the
tenant possesses in his own right are ordinary household belongings,
the roof beams of his house, and his personal livestock. Practice
probably differs markedly from theory. So far as I could judge in the
Balik country at any rate at least 90% of the population of any gund
were not only Balik tribesmen but also members of the Agha's own taifa,
many of them being his near kinsmen. It would seem then that the
Agha's right of eviction remains theoretical except under extreme
provocation. In practice the right of tenancy is hereditable. This [428]
latter point was confirmed to me by Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Walash; the
way he put it was that when a tenant died he, the Agha, could do what-
ever he liked with the land, but that "as a rule" he gave it to the
deceased's son or brother whichever was the most suitable. It may be
noted that such a procedure would tend to prevent the land being split
up into a vast number of small holdings by the process of inheritance,
and would also provide an economic bond between the members of the
smaller extended family groups.

The tribal custom here is not, as might at first sight appear, 423
at variance with Mohammedan law. According to the Koranic rule a 428
man's testamentary rights are limited and most of his "property" (milk)
is passed on in defined proportions to certain specific relatives.
Land however is for the most part excluded in the term milk. The
actual legal position as it applies to land tenure in Iraq is somewhat
involved and the interested reader should refer direct to Sir E.
Dowson's "An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions" (Iraq
Government 1932). The following account summarises the position.

The legal situation regarding the inheritance of land tenure is
defined by the Ottoman Land Code of 1858, and certain subsidiary
enactments of the old Turkish Empire. This recognises five classes of

"I have no data to show what rental is really paid. I was [427]
assured on several different occasions and in different contexts at
Rowanduz, Walash and Dergala that the normal arrangement is for the
Agha to receive half the gross yield of the land if the tenant
provides his own cattle, implements, seed, etc., but two thirds of the
gross yield if the Agha provides the seed, implements, etc. According
to Hay (p. 68) the figure is only 10% of the yield. But as I shall
show presently a 50% rental is probably not as excessive as it sounds.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
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The Clan Agha

The gund Aghas' relations to their tenants has now been defined; they in turn owe allegiance to the Agha of the taifa. This individual also may glibly claim to own all the land of all the gunds under his suzerainty, but his ownership is of a much more nominal variety than that of the gund Agha. The taifa Agha does not levy any specific charge upon his underlings but rather receives from them gifts in proportion to his usefulness. Thus Hamid Amin Agha of Nanparian, even though he belonged to the same tira as Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Palash head of the Mallasherifi and nominal paramount of all the Balik, did not admit that the latter was in any general sense his superior; though Sheikh Mohammad for his part claimed that Hamid Amin was his vassal. This discrepancy I think is only partly due to the recent loosening of political ties. In general it would appear that prior to the coming of the external administration the function of the taifa Agha was roughly that of arbitrator and court of appeal rather than dominating overlord. He seems to have been called in to arbitrate in small scale feuds, settle disputes between neighbouring villages over grazing rights and water, settle divorce disputes and so forth. For these services he would be suitably recompensed by the parties to the dispute.

This system of justice was doubtless exceedingly corrupt by European standards, but probably worked tolerably well. It is not clear what sanctions could be employed to enforce judiciary decisions of this sort. Today the claimsman is encouraged to short-circuit the traditional machinery of the Aghas' courts and appeal for justice direct to the police. To some extent the two systems continue to operate side by side but with the continual lessening of the Aghas' authority litigation tends more and more to be a matter for the external administration only. I tried to obtain some opinions as to the relative efficiency of the old system and the new. The results were interesting. It was admitted that the decisions of the Agha in the old days were somewhat arbitrary, being based on considerations of wealth and nepotism rather than moral right, but at least a decision was arrived at quickly. The modern procedure on the other hand though plainly well intentioned is considered in practice to be slow, complicated and costly, and since the wealthier litigant can nearly always manage to appeal to a higher court if the first decision goes against him, the "justice" is nearly as one sided as before. Moreover it was argued that the police were just as corrupt as the Aghas with the disadvantage that, whereas formerly the Aghas were to some extent limited in their decisions by kinship obligations, the police had no interest at all except to sell justice to the highest bidder. Though this is certainly an overstatement of the case, many of the Iraqi police do appear to be exceedingly corrupt. So much so in fact that the new Qa'im Maqam of Rowanduz, chief magistrate of the district, was generally acclaimed by all as the almost unique example of a sincere

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
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Administration moreover adopted the Turkish expedient of paying the tribal Aghas an annual salary provided they kept their tribe in order. This procedure undoubtedly gave the tribal Agha an altogether disproportionate economic influence, and has had various repercussions which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

The salary awarded to Sheikh Mohammad of Balak was stopped some years ago and, as might be expected, his influence as tribal leader declined rapidly. As is evidenced by the rival claims of the Aghas of Bayat and Bunt noted above, the Balik has scarcely any functioning unity as a tribe at the present time, though Sheikh Mohammad with a wide sweep of his arm, still declares that all the land belongs to him and that the taifas of Shawdin and Bakr are only there on sufferance. At the present moment (1938) his prestige is probably on the upgrade since he has recently been appointed a "member of Parliament" and regularly attends the legislative assembly in Baghdad. The appointment carries with it a small salary, but its real importance so far as the tribes are concerned is that it demonstrates that the holder is in favour with the Mutasarrif and with the Baghdad Authorities.

Kinship Structure

While I have here sketched out the superficial political structure of the community the real nature of the relationship between the various Aghas and their followers can only be understood in terms of kinship.

The essentially conditional nature of the Aghas' authority was only vaguely understood by the earlier British Administrators. Say for instance remarks (p. 67) "The Aghas are very oppressive to their tenants, more especially where the Government is close at hand and can assert its authority. In the mountain districts the tribesmen are exceedingly poor, they have little to fear from the Government, and their chief finds it difficult to coerce them. A rival chief would probably soon appear if he did". This statement brings out the fact, already well known from examples in the African field, that Government support for "the Chief" frequently gives that individual a tyrannical authority quite foreign to the ordinary tribal system of government, but it does not explain the Aghas normal relationship to his followers.

Marriage of Commoners

As we have seen already the taifa is essentially a patrilineal clan. It is moreover largely endogamous by virtue of the system of ortho-cousin marriage common to most Mohammedan societies. Reference to the tables of Kinship Terminology at the end of this book

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 940 MA11 Kurd MA11
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601 A reference to the tables of kinship terminology at the end of this book will show that the various cousin are known by the following terms

Father's Brother's children - amosa
Father's Sister's children - purrsa
Mother's Brother's children - khalosa
Mother's Sister's children - purrsa

My knowledge of the Kurdish language was not sufficient to verify the exact use of these terms, and to some extent my informants were contradictory. It would appear however that some of these terms are "classificatory" at least so far as all members of Ego's own tira are concerned. Thus to quote an example Hamid Amin i Hamyurdan considers himself amosa to Sheikh Mohammadi Talesh. Hamid Amin is actually great-great-grandson of Mir Mahal Agha and Sheikh Mohammad is great-grandson of the same man. Again I was told of the Dizai tribe, a group widely scattered in Area C that they all call one another amosa" - (implying that they were all one tira)

According to my informants the order of preferred marriages is:-

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1st Amosa
2nd Purrsa (Father's sister's daughter)
3rd Khalosa
4th Purrsa (Mother's sister's daughter)

This statement seems consistent with the customs recorded for other Mohammedan areas (See Seligman II. op.cit 268) but I was unable to check the frequency of particular types of marriage. It should be noted that Father's Brother's Daughter (amosa) and Mother's Sister's Daughter (purrsa) may frequently be the same individual, and similarly Mother's Brother's Daughter (Khalosa) may coincide with Father's sister's Daughter (purrsa). Amosa and khalosa could however only coincide if both were used in aclassificatory sense. I did not actually encounter any classificatory use of the term khalosa and this probably refers only to the immdiate children of the mother's brother (khalo). It would appear that until very recently not only was marriage between amosa the preferred norm, it was also a definite right. May (p. 71) even records the gruesome murder of a girl who refused to abide by this ruling. Today though marriage restrictions are to some extent relaxed it s probable that the great majority of commoners still take their wive from within the patrilineal group. There is in fact very little choice in the matter. In the Balik country at any rate the proportion of 'strangers' - e.g. Jews, Assyrian Christians, traders, Kurds fro other tribes and so forth, is very small; nearly everyone withinthe group belongs to one of the three patrilineal clans. These clns moreover are themselves more or less segregated each by itself. Within any single gund nearly everyone is of the same clan as the Agha.

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622 through the marriage of his sons to nearly every important leader,
581 tribal, religious, or townsman, within fifty miles radius. More humble Aghas are content with one or two alliances with neighbouring notables, while the rest of their offspring are married off to members of their own community, thus further strengthening the bonds of kinship between the Agha and his followers. It is interesting to examine the effect of this in greater detail.

> Sheikh Mohammad of Walash was one of 9 surviving brothers; he himself has had nine wives and has six surviving sons, and several daughters
>
> Mir Hamid Amin of Dergala has had 6 wives and 24 children of which there survive 9 sons and 5 daughters.

If we consider the male side of the tree only, it would appear that the average reproduction rate of a 'princely' Agha is of the order of 8 surviving sons. If we assume that the total population of the villages remains very roughly stationary we must reach the conclusion that the effective birthrate is very heavily loaded in favour of the Aghas. The effect of this would seem to be that in many of the smaller villages the Agha is not only of the same clan as nearly everyone but actually quite closely related to about half the population. I was unable to make any accurate census of a village but my observations at Walash were I think reasonably accurate, and tend to confirm this calculation.

622 There appeared to be twelve separate households, of which four
592 are accounted for by the Agha's fortress and the establishments of his third and fourth married sons and of a brother. (The two eldest sons have been established as Aghas in their own right over neighbouring villages). The population I estimated at ninety, in the proportion twenty five men, thirty women, thirty five children. The Aghas household appeared to consist of about twenty persons including his younger children and personal servants; while the households of his married sons and his brother contained about eight persons each. In this case therefore quite half the population of the gund was in immediate kinship or economic relationship with the Agha. The case may be exceptional, but serves to explain why a rental of 50% of the yield of the land does not in practice prove entirely extortionate.

622 Comparison of these observations and those of Hay

a 614 The foregoing account shows the interrelationship of the
114 political and kinship organisation among the Balik Kurds. As a commentary upon sociological method it is interesting to note what

"This village would appear to be fairly average so far as size is concerned, though centres such as Dergala and Nerge are vastly larger. Walash however is in some respects the private fortress of Sheikh Mohammad and its kinship organisation may not be typical.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
Rowanduz

happens when the same empirical facts are considered without an adequate appreciation of the sociological significance of kinship. The following quotations illustrate the position of the Agha as understood by Hay.

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The first is reasonable enough:-

(p. 65) A tribe is a community or federation of communities which exists for the protection of its members against external aggression and for the maintenance of the old racial customs and standards of life. Some tribes have no recognised chiefs some have many.

The second is more hypothetical:-

(p. 65/66) The position of the chief varies greatly in different tribes. In the remoter mountains, though granted the most ungrudging obedience, he is distinctly one of the tribesmen, the leading member of a family which has won its headship through military prowess. Lower down he often belongs to an entirely separate caste, and comes from a different stock to the tribesmen. The large tribes are divided into sections, and in different tribes we find many sections with the same names. This points to the fact that the sections represent the original owners of the soil, while the present chiefs belong to powerful families who have invaded their domains and siezed their lands. This is notably the case with the Dizai where nearly all the land belongs to one powerful family, against which a few old tribal Aghas and headmen still maintain an unequal struggle. Here the chief is a landlord, and the system that prevails is feudal rather than tribal.

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[621]
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The statement that in the foothill and plains area the Aghas are frequently of different stock to their villagers is valid and has already been commented upon in Chapter 1. The idea that the taifas "represent the original owners of the soil", while the paramount tribal Aghas are conquering overlords is mere fantasy; while as for the Dizai the facts seem to be that the tribe itself is "all one family" (taifa) while the land is mostly held by town dwelling landlords who have no kinship affiliations with the Dizai at all. While this lineage distinction between Agha and tenant is valid for the plains area, it does not apply to the tribal districts. The following for instance is quite absurb:-

(Hay, p. 42) In the bigger tribes the Aghas, whose families have for many generations been entirely disassociated from manual labour, are of a far finer type than the peasants.

8: Leach E-S (1938) 1940 MAll Kurd MAll
"Rowanduz

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621 Both generalisations may lead to some startling sociological
622 conclusions:-
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(p.222) This village (Nerga; Map 2) lies just below Sheikh Mohammad Agha's residence (Walash) in the Balik country, and its inhabitants, some fifty families in number, are nearly all his relations. Being of 'chiefly' descent they consider it beneath their dignity to cultivate the soil; they have therefore only two means of livelihood, sponging on Sheikh Mohammad Agha who pays them most of his salary to keep them quiet, and looting and taking toll from the caravans that pass along the Persian Road.

This paragraph I consider most illuminating. For it is precisely on the basis of such evidence that the British policy of 'military pacification' is carried out on all the outlying frontiers of Empire. The tribesmen just beyond the border are always, it seems, "desperate bandits and brigands" intent on plundering the innocent peasantry within the jurisdiction of the British raj. Hay of course does not intentionally deceive. He had only seen Nerga from afar and was merely recording the position as outlined to him by Sheikh Mohammad. In giving this account however Sheikh Mohammad was fairly obviously blackmailing the British Administrator for more money, and was probably himself responsible for the particular piece of brigandage complained of. Nerga today has one of the most extensive cultivations of the whole district, and is considered a prosperous village. There seems no reason to suppose that the position was radically different in 1930, even though the ravages of war had temporarily disorganised the agricultural arrangements of the whole area.

721 This is not special pleading on behalf of the villagers of Nerga
161 or of the Kurds in general, but it is time that their nefarious activities were seen in proper proportion. It must be admitted that prior to the establishment of an external Authority most Kurdish tribes freely resorted to brigandage on every possible occasion. It was a socially approved aspect of inter-tribal life and one upon which the Kurds themselves lay great emphasis in folk tale and tradition. But it is this very emphasis that has led to the fabulous distortions that appear in all accounts of Kurdish life either lay or official. To read the literature one must suppose that in former times the majority of Kurdish communities lived solely on the proceeds of plunder and ransom; and while the Government continues its present policy of cultural suppression such fallacies are obviously convenient. But the unbiassed observer cannot avoid the conclusion that most of the more spectacular exploits of Kurdish brigandage are products of the Kurds' own imagination. Seen in their proper scale these warlike activities can never have been more than an exciting gloss upon the normal balanced cycle of agricultural economics.

8: Leach E-5 (1938) 1940 MA11 Kurd MA11
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Points of Analysis calling for Further Study

The foregoing analysis has thrown emphasis on the fact that the Agha is of the same kinship group as the majority of his followers and very closely related to many of them. It was interesting to note that in conversation Mir Hamid Amin of Dergala differentiated between "khesm khotmana" (my relatives) and "kurmanj" (peasantry), but I doubt whether there is any precise dividing line between the two classifications. I noted that he included in the former term at least some of his second cousins. The practical distinction seemed to be that his khesm were allowed to sit in his guest house by right while the kurmanj could only do so by special invitation. Linguistically there appeared to be a confusion between the terms kurmanj and mashaya both of which were translated to me as arabic fallahin (peasant). In this area however there is considerable overlapping between the two Kurdish dialects of Kirmanji and Kurdi and the confusion is probably only due to my linguistic incompetence.

Another point that requires further examination is the precise inheritance of the title Agha. We have seen that from the point of view of political organisation each gund has at any time one, and only one, Agha, in the sense of landlord. The succession however does not necessarily follow the rule of primogeniture. As it happens both Sheikh Mohammad Agha of Balash and Ali Agha of Bayat have living with them in the same village brothers who are older than themselves. In the former case the elder brother leads a retired life and takes no part in village affairs; in the latter Abdullah Agha who lives in Ali Agha's house in Bayat throughout the winter moves off into the mountains in the summer with the sheep and goats and a few of the villagers and establishes his own hoba (settlement of black tents). But though Abdullah is the elder brother there is never any suggestion that anyone but Ali Agha is head of the group. On the other hand though the Agha of Bayat is quite definitely Ali Agha the title is much more widely distributed as a form of address. Thus in Bayat the old chief Ali, his brother, his two nephew's Kharia and Ali and presumably his adult son also (who was away during my visit) are all given the title Agha in ordinary speech. And this seems to be the normal usage, thus Hamid Amin's brother in Rangurdan is known as Rasul Agha though he does not function as a landlord, and Sheikh Mohammad Agha's four eldest sons all carry the title. What is not clear is how the title is inherited as the lineage spreads, for instance will the sons of Kharia, who will in their time presumably be second cousins of the reigning Agha of Bayat also carry the title? Probably there is no definite rule.

In the remainder of this book where I refer to the Agha or the Aghas of a particular group I shall imply only those individuals who fulfil the sociological function of the Agha, and not any sons or near relatives who happen to bear the same title. The sociological function of the gund Agha can be quite clearly defined. He is the